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Abstract
We present a general formal argumentation system for dealing with the
detachment of conditional obligations. Given a set of facts, constraints,
and conditional obligations, we answer the question whether an uncon-
ditional obligation is detachable by considering reasons for and against
its detachment. For the evaluation of arguments in favor of detaching
obligations we use a Dung-style argumentation-theoretical semantics. We
illustrate the modularity of the general framework by considering some
extensions, and we compare the framework to some related approaches
from the literature.
Keywords : formal argumentation, ASPIC+, conditional norms, conflicting
norms, prioritized norms, factual detachment, deontic detachment.
1 Introduction
We take an argumentative perspective on the problem of detaching conditional
obligations relative to a set of facts and constraints. We allow for the construc-
tion of arguments the deontic conclusions of which are candidates for detach-
ment. Next, we define a number of ways in which these arguments may attack
one another, as when the conclusions of two arguments are conflicting. We
borrow Dung’s semantics [6] for evaluating arguments relative to the attack re-
lations that hold between them. Conclusions of arguments which are evaluated
positively are safely detachable in our framework. They can be interpreted as
all-things-considered obligations – following Ross [28] – or output obligations –
following Makinson & van der Torre [18, 19].
∗The research of both authors was supported by a Sofja Kovalevskaja award of the Alexan-
der von Humboldt-Foundation, funded by the German Ministry for Education and Research.
The argumentative approach defended in this paper is both natural and
precise. Norms which guide reasoning are naturally construed as conclusions of
proof sequences. Objections raised against the derivation of certain obligations
are naturally construed as argumentative attacks. Arguments are naturally
evaluated in terms of the objections raised against them.
In Section 2 we introduce a basic argumentation system for evaluating ar-
guments the conclusions of which can be interpreted as all-things-considered
obligations. This generic, modular framework can be extended in various ways,
as we illustrate in Section 3. We show how various mechanisms for conflict-
resolution can be implemented (Section 3.1), and how we can rule out obliga-
tions committing us to further violations or conflicts (Section 3.2). In Section
4 we compare our approach to related systems from the literature. We end by
pointing to some further expansions of our framework, which we aim to present
in a follow-up paper (Section 5).
2 The basic framework
We start by reviewing the basic concepts needed from Dung’s semantics (Section
2.1). Next we turn to the construction of deontic arguments (Section 2.2) and
attack definitions (Section 2.3). We define a consequence relation for detaching
all-things-considered obligations in deontic argumentation frameworks (Section
2.4), and present some of its meta-theoretical properties (Section 2.5).
2.1 Abstract argumentation
A Dung-style abstract argumentation framework (AF) is a pair (A,Att) where
A is a set of arguments and Att ⊆ A×A is a binary relation of attack. Relative
to an AF, Dung defines a number of extensions – subsets of A – on the basis of
which we can evaluate the arguments in A.
Definition 1 (Complete and grounded extension). Let (A,Att) be an AF. For
any a ∈ A, a is acceptable w.r.t. some S ⊆ A (or, S defends a) iff for all b such
that (b, a) ∈ Att there is a c ∈ S for which (c, b) ∈ Att.
If S ⊆ A is conflict-free, i.e. there are no a, b ∈ S for which (a, b) ∈ Att, then:
• S is a complete extension iff a ∈ S whenever a is acceptable w.r.t. S;
• S is the grounded extension iff it is the set inclusion minimal complete
extension.
Dung [6] showed that for every AF there is a grounded extension, it is unique,
and it can be constructed as follows.
Definition 2 (Defense). A set of arguments X defends an argument a iff every
attacker of a is attacked by some b ∈ X .
Definition 3 (Construction of the grounded extension). The grounded exten-
sion G relative to an AF (A,Att) is defined as follows (where A is countable):
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• G0: the set of all arguments in A without attackers;
• Gi+1: all arguments defended by Gi;
• G =
⋃
i≥0 Gi
Besides the grounded extension, a number of further extensions (preferred,
(semi-)stable, ideal etc.) have been defined in the literature. Due to space
limitations, we focus exclusively on grounded extensions in the remainder.
On Dung’s abstract approach [6], arguments are basic units of analysis the
internal structure of which is not represented. But nothing prevents us from
instantiating such abstract arguments by conceptualizing them as proof trees for
deriving a conclusion based on a set of premises and inference rules. Frameworks
with instantiated arguments are called structured argumentation frameworks
(for examples, see e.g. [1]).1 In the remainder of Section 2 we show how questions
regarding obligation detachment in deontic logic can be addressed and answered
within structured deontic argumentation frameworks.
2.2 Instantiating deontic arguments
Our formal language L is defined as follows:
P := {p, q, r, . . .} L⇒ := 〈LP 〉 ⇒ 〈LP 〉
LP := P | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬〈LP 〉 | 〈LP 〉 ∨ 〈LP 〉 LO := O〈LP 〉
L := 〈LP 〉 | 〈LP 〉 | ¬〈L〉 | 〈L〉 ∨ 〈L〉 L := LP | L | L⇒ | LO
The classical connectives ∧,⊃,≡ are defined in terms of ¬ and ∨. We represent
facts as members of LP . Where A,B ∈ LP , conditional obligations are formulas
of the form A ⇒ B, read ‘If A, then it – prima facie – ought to be that B’ or
‘If A, then B is prima facie obligatory’.2 Where A ∈ LP , a constraint A
abbreviates that A is settled, i.e. that A holds unalterably.3 Formulas of the
form OA (where A ∈ LP ) represent all-things-considered obligations.
Unless specified otherwise, upper case letters A,B, . . . denote members of
LP and upper case Greek letters Γ,∆, . . . denote subsets of LP ∪ L ∪ L⇒.
Where Γ ⊆ L and † ∈ {P,,⇒,O}, Γ† = Γ ∩ L†.
Cn
CL
(Γ) denotes the closure of Γ ⊆ LP under propositional classical logic,
CL. Cn
L
(Γ) denotes the closure of Γ ⊆ L under L, which we use as a
1Our approach is similar in spirit to the ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation
from e.g. [20]. We return to this point in Section 4.2.
2Depending on the context of application, the following alternative readings are also fine:
‘If A is the case, then B is pro tanto obligatory’, ‘If A, then the agent ought (prima facie, pro
tanto) to bring about B’. On the latter, agentive reading, we can think of ‘⇒’ as implicitly
indexed by an agent.
3If A holds, then the fact that A is deemed fixed, necessary, and unalterable. Obligations
which contradict these facts are unalterably violated. Carmo & Jones cite three factors giving
rise to such unalterable violations. The first is time, e.g. when you did not return a book you
ought to have returned by its due date. The second is causal necessity, e.g. when you killed
a person you ought not to have killed. The third is practical impossibility, e.g. when a dog
owner stubbornly refuses to keep her dog against the house regulations, and nobody else dares
to try and convince her to remove it [4, pp. 283-284].
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generic name for a modal logic for representing background constraints, e.g. T,
S4, S5, etc. In our examples below, we will assume that L is normal and
validates the axiom A ⊃ A.4
Arguments are ordered pairs 〈A : s〉 in which A is called the conclusion,
and s a proof sequence for deriving A. We use lower case letters a, b, c, . . . as
placeholders for arguments.
Definition 4. Given a premise set Γ, we allow the following rules for construct-
ing arguments:
(i) If A ∈ Cn
L
(Γ), then 〈A : −−〉 is an argument; (where −− denotes
the empty proof sequence)
(ii) If A⇒ B ∈ Γ⇒ and A ∈ Cn
L
(Γ), then 〈OB : A,A⇒ B〉 is an argument;
(iii) If A⇒ B ∈ Γ⇒ and a = 〈OA : . . .〉 is an argument, then 〈OB : a,A⇒ B〉
is an argument;
(iv) If a = 〈OA : . . .〉 and b = 〈OB : . . .〉 are arguments, then 〈O(A ∧B) : a, b〉
is an argument.
(v) If a = 〈OA : . . .〉 is an argument and (A ⊃ B) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ), then 〈OB :
a,(A ⊃ B)〉 is an argument.
Argument a is a deontic argument if a is of the form 〈OA : . . .〉. We use C(a)
to denote the set of all formulas in L used in the construction of a, including
its conclusion. E.g. where a = 〈Oq : p, p ⇒ q〉 and b = 〈Or : a, q ⇒ r〉,
C(a) = {p, p ⇒ q,Oq} and C(b) = {p, p ⇒ q,Oq, q ⇒ r,Or}. Argument a is
a sub-argument of argument b if C(a) ⊆ C(b); a is a proper sub-argument of
argument b if C(a) ⊂ C(b); and b is a super-argument of argument a if a is a
proper sub-argument of b.
(ii)-(v) correspond to inference rules well-known from deontic logic. (ii) al-
lows for the factual detachment of an all-things-considered obligation OB from a
conditional prima facie obligation A⇒ B and a fact A. (iii) is a deontic detach-
ment principle. (iv) and (v) allow for obligation aggregation (or agglomeration),
resp. inheritance (or weakening).
Example 1 (Constructing arguments). Let Γ1 = {p,⊤ ⇒ ¬p,¬p ⇒ ¬q, p ⇒
q}. By Definition 4 we can construct – amongst others – the following arguments
from Γ1:
a1: 〈p : −−〉 a4: 〈Oq : p, p⇒ q〉
a2: 〈O¬p : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ ¬p〉 a5: 〈O(¬q ∧ q) : a3, a4〉
a3: 〈O¬q : a2,¬p⇒ ¬q〉 a6: 〈O(q ∨ r) : a4,(q ⊃ (q ∨ r))〉
Argument a1 is constructed from p ∈ Γ1 in view of (i). Arguments a2 and
a4 are constructed by means of (ii)
5; a3 is constructed from a2 by means of (iii);
a5 is constructed from a3 and a4 by (iv); and a6 is constructed from a4 by (v).
4Moreover, where ∆⇒ ⊆ L⇒, we assume that Γ ⊢
L
A iff Γ ∪∆⇒ ⊢
L
A.
5Note that, in the construction of argument a4, the formula p follows from Γ1 by p and
since ⊢
L
p ⊃ p.
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We can interpret Γ1 as representing a classic contrary-to-duty (CTD) sce-
nario (for the sake of readability, we omit the qualifier ‘prima facie’ in our
reading of conditional obligations):6
⊤ ⇒ ¬p There ought not be a dog.
¬p⇒ ¬q If there is no dog, there ought not be a warning sign.
p⇒ q If there is a dog, there ought to be a warning sign.
p It is settled that there is a dog.
Of course, not all of the conclusions of arguments a2-a6 qualify as all-things-
considered obligations. Argument a5, for instance, is internally incoherent and
should be filtered out when evaluating the arguments constructed from Γ1.
Arguments are evaluated in terms of the attack relations which hold amongst
them. Before we turn to the definition of these relations, we point out that rules
(i)-(v) in Definition 4 allow for a version of the necessitation rule whenever L
is a normal modal logic. For instance, given a premise set {p,⊤⇒ q}, we can
construct the argument a1 = 〈Oq : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ q〉 by (ii). Since p ⊢L (q ⊃ p),
we can construct the argument a2 = 〈Op : a1,(q ⊃ p)〉 by (v). If desired, the
construction of a2 can be prevented by defining – in addition to ‘⊃’ – a weaker
(non-material) implication connective in L on the basis of which to construct
arguments in line with clause (v) in Definition 4.
2.3 Attacking deontic arguments
In our basic framework, we define two ways in which arguments may attack one
another. First, we take care that unalterably violated obligations are attacked
by the constraints which violate them. (We write A = −B in case A = ¬B or
B = ¬A.)
Definition 5 (Fact attack). Where a = 〈OA : . . .〉 is an argument, let UO(a) =
{B | OB ∈ C(a)}. Where ∅ 6= Θ ⊆ UO(a), 〈−
∧
Θ : −−〉 attacks a.
In Example 1 the obligation O¬p cannot guide the agent’s actions, since
it cannot be acted upon in view of the constraint p. Definition 5 takes care
that a1 attacks a2, since UO(b) = {¬p}. Note that, as soon as A ∈ UO(a) for
some argument a and formula A, A ∈ UO(b) for any super-argument b of a.
Consequently, if an argument c attacks a in view of Definition 5, then c also
attacks all super-arguments b of a. So in Example 1 the argument a1 attacks
a2 as well as its super-arguments a3 and a5.
Since we assume that L is a normal modal logic, we know that (¬(¬q ∧
q)) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ1). Hence, by Definition 5 again, argument a7 = 〈(¬(¬q ∧ q)) :
−−〉 attacks argument a5 from Example 1.
Example 2 (Attacks on incoherent arguments). Let Γ2 = {⊤ ⇒ p,⊤ ⇒
¬p,⊤ ⇒ q}. We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ2:
a1: 〈Op : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ p〉 a4: 〈O(p ∨ ¬q) : a1,(p ⊃ (p ∨ ¬q))〉
a2: 〈O¬p : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ ¬p〉 a5: 〈O(¬p ∧ (p ∨ ¬q) : a2, a4〉
a3: 〈Oq : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ q〉 a6: 〈O¬q : a5,((¬p ∧ (p ∨ ¬q)) ⊃ ¬q)〉
6The example is adapted from [27].
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By Definition 5:
UO(a5) = {p, p ∨ ¬q,¬p,¬p ∧ (p ∨ ¬q)}
UO(a6) = {p, p ∨ ¬q,¬p,¬p ∧ (p ∨ ¬q),¬q}
Hence, both a5 and a6 are attacked by a7:
a7 = 〈¬(p ∧ ¬p) : −−〉
Arguments a5 and a6 are incoherent in the sense that in constructing them
we relied on arguments the conclusions of which are conflicting (namely a1
and a2). It is vital that we are able to filter out such incoherent arguments.
Definition 5 takes care of that. By attacking a6, argument a7 protects (defends)
the unproblematic a3, which is attacked by a6 in view of Definition 6 below.
We return to this point in footnote 8, after we explained how arguments are
evaluated.
The second type of attack relation ensures that mutually incompatible obli-
gations attack each other:
Definition 6 (Conflict attack). a = 〈O−A : . . .〉 attacks b = 〈OA : . . .〉, and a
attacks all of b’s super-arguments.
In Example 1, arguments a3 and a4 attack each other according to Definition
6. Moreover, a3 attacks a5 and a6; and a4 attacks a5. Likewise, in Example 2,
a1 and a2 attack each other, and so do a3 and a6. Moreover, a1 attacks a5 and
a6; and a2 attacks a4, a5, and a6.
Example 3 (Conflict attack). Let Γ3 = {p, q, p ⇒ r, (p ∧ q) ⇒ s,¬(r ∧ s)}.
We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ3:
a1: 〈Or : p, p⇒ r〉 a4: 〈¬(r ∧ s) : −−〉
a2: 〈Os : p ∧ q, (p ∧ q)⇒ s〉 a5: 〈O¬r : a2,(s ⊃ ¬r)〉
a3: 〈O(r ∧ s) : a1, a2〉 a6: 〈O¬s : a1,(r ⊃ ¬s)〉
a4 attacks a3 by Definition 5. By Definition 6 a1 attacks a5; a5 attacks a1, a3,
and a6; a2 attacks a6; and a6 attacks a2, a3, and a5.
2.4 Evaluating deontic arguments
For the evaluation of deontic arguments relative to a premise set, we extend
Dung-style AFs to deontic argumentation frameworks, and we borrow Dung’s
argument evaluation mechanism from Definitions 1-3:
Definition 7 (DAF). The deontic argumentation framework (DAF) for Γ ⊆
LP ∪ L ∪ L⇒ is an ordered pair 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉 where
• A(Γ) is the set of arguments constructed from Γ in line with Definition 4;
and
• where a, b ∈ A(Γ): (a, b) ∈ Att(Γ) iff a attacks b according to Definition 5
or Definition 6.
6
a7
¬(¬q ∧ q)
a6
O(q ∨ r)
a5
O(¬q ∧ q)〉
a4
Oq
a3
O¬q
a2
O¬p
a1
p
Figure 1: Arguments and attack relations for Γ1.
Like AFs, DAFs can be represented as directed graphs. Here, for instance,
is a graph depicting the arguments we constructed on the basis of Γ1:
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Nodes in the graph represent the arguments constructed on the basis of Γ1 in
Example 1. Below the arguments’ names, we stated their conclusions. Arrows
represent attacks. Dotted lines represent sub-argument relations.
We evaluate arguments in a DAF using Dung’s grounded semantics from
Section 2.1: In Definition 1, replace A (resp. Att) with A(Γ) (resp. Att(Γ)).
Similarly for Definition 3, where we also replace occurrences of G and Gi with
G(Γ) and Gi(Γ) respectively.
Let us now apply Definition 3 to Example 1. Clearly, a1, a7 ∈ G0(Γ1),
since Definitions 5 and 6 provide us with no means to attack arguments the
conclusions of which are members of Γ1 . In the next step of our construction,
a4, a6 ∈ G1(Γ1), since they are defended by a1 ∈ G0(Γ1). a2, a3, a5 6∈ G1(Γ1),
since each of these arguments is attacked by a1 (hence undefended).
We cannot construct any further arguments which attack a4 or a6 and which
do not contain any of the undefended arguments a2 or a3 as sub-arguments.
Moreover, we show in the Appendix (Lemma 2) that, for any premise set Γ,
if a ∈ G(Γ), then a ∈ G1(Γ). By the Definition 3, a1, a4, a6, a7 ∈ G(Γ1) while
a2, a3, a5 6∈ G(Γ1).
Definition 8 (DAF-consequence). Where Γ ⊆ LP ∪ L ∪ L⇒ and A ∈ LP ,
Γ ⊢DAF OA iff there is an argument a ∈ G(Γ) with conclusion OA.
By Definition 8, Γ1 ⊢DAF Oq and Γ1 ⊢DAF O(q ∨ r), while Γ1 6⊢DAF O¬p and
Γ1 6⊢DAF O¬q.
In Example 2, Γ2 ⊢DAF Oq.
8 We leave it to the reader to check that none
of Op,O¬p,O(p ∨ ¬q), or O¬q is a DAF-consequence of Γ2, and that none of
Or,Os,O(r ∧ s),O¬r, or O¬s is a DAF-consequence of Γ3.
7Due to space limitations, we leave it to the reader to construct similar graphs for the
other examples in this paper.
8 The conclusion Oq of argument a3 in Example 2 is accepted despite its being attacked
by a6. The reason is that a6 is in turn attacked by a7, so that a7 defends a3 from the attack
by a6.
7
2.5 Rationality postulates
In [3, Sec. 4] the properties of output closure and output consistency were pro-
posed as desiderata for well-behaved argumentation systems. WhereOutput(Γ) =
{A | Γ ⊢DAF OA}:
Property 1 (Closure). Output(Γ) = CnCL(Output(Γ)).
Property 2 (Consistency). CnCL(Output(Γ)) is consistent.
Properties 1 and 2 follow for DAF in view of resp. Theorems 1 and 2 in the
Appendix. Property 3 is proven in Theorem 3 in the Appendix:
Property 3 (Cautious cut/cumulative transitivity). Let ∆⇒ = {⊤ ⇒ A | A ∈
∆}. If Γ ⊢DAF OA for all A ∈ ∆ and Γ ∪∆⇒ ⊢DAF OB, then Γ ⊢DAF OB.
Properties 4 and 5 fail for DAF:
Property 4 (Cautious monotonicity). If Γ ⊢DAF OA and Γ ⊢DAF OB, then
Γ ∪ {⊤ ⇒ A} ⊢DAF OB.
Property 5 (Rational monotonicity). If Γ ⊢DAF OA and Γ 6⊢DAF O¬B, then
Γ ∪ {⊤ ⇒ B} ⊢DAF OA
Example 4 (Failure of properties 4 and 5, adapted from [2]). Let Γ4 = {p, p⇒
q, q ⇒ r, r ⇒ ¬q,¬q ⇒ s,⊤ ⇒ ¬s}. We construct the following arguments on
the basis of Γ4:
a1: 〈Oq : p, p⇒ q〉 a4: 〈Os : a3,¬q ⇒ s〉
a2: 〈Or : a1, q ⇒ r〉 a5: 〈O¬s : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ ¬s〉
a3: 〈O¬q : a2, r ⇒ ¬q〉 a6: 〈¬(q ∧ ¬q) : −−〉
By Definition 6: a1 attacks a3 and a4; a3 attacks all of a1-a4 (including
itself); and a4 and a5 attack each other. By Definition 5, a6 attacks a3 and a4,
since both q and ¬q are members of UO(a3) and UO(a4). As a result, Oq,Or,
and O¬s are DAF-consequences of Γ4, while O¬q and Os are not.
Now add the new conditional obligation ⊤ ⇒ r to Γ4, so that we obtain the
new arguments
a7: 〈Or : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ r〉 a9: 〈Os : a8,¬q ⇒ s〉
a8: 〈O¬q : a7, r ⇒ ¬q〉
None of these new arguments is attacked by a6, which defends a1 and a5
from the attacks by a3 and a4 respectively. By Definition 6, a8 and a1 attack
each other. So do a9 and a5. As a result, none of a1, a5, a8, and a9 is in the
grounded extension of Γ4∪{⊤ ⇒ r}. So we have a counter-example to Property
4: Γ4 ⊢DAF Or and Γ4 ⊢DAF O¬s, while Γ4 ∪ {⊤ ⇒ r} 6⊢DAF O¬s.
This example also serves to illustrate the failure of Property 5 for DAF.
Arguments with conclusion O¬r can be constructed on the basis of Γ4 only on
the basis of incoherent arguments. Let, for instance:
a10: 〈O(q ∧ ¬q) : a1, a3〉 a11: 〈O¬r : a10,((q ∧ ¬q) ⊃ ¬r)〉
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In view of Definition 5, arguments constructed on an incoherent basis are
attacked by an otherwise unattacked argument. For instance, a11 is attacked by
the unattacked argument a6. Because of this, Γ4 6⊢DAF O¬r. But then, since
Γ4 ⊢DAF O¬s and Γ4 ∪ {⊤ ⇒ r} 6⊢DAF O¬s, Property 5 fails for DAF.
3 Beyond the basics
3.1 Conflict-resolution
3.1.1 Resolving conflicts via logical analysis
It has been argued that, in cases of conflict, more specific obligations should be
given precedence over less specific ones.9 Consider the following example:
Example 5 (Specificity). Let Γ5 = {q, r, q ⇒ p, (q∧r)⇒ ¬p}. We can interpret
Γ5 as representing a scenario in which an agent is making carrot soup. Let p, q,
and, respectively, r abbreviate ‘there is fennel’, ‘there are carrots’, and ‘there is
celery’. If there are carrots in the garden still, our agent should take care that
he buys fennel in order to make the soup (q ⇒ p). However, if both carrots and
celery are in the garden, he should not get fennel ((q ∧ r)⇒ ¬p), because celery
can be used instead of fennel. As it turns out, both carrots and celery are in his
garden (q, r). The desirable outcome in this case is that the agent ought not go
out and buy fennel.
A principled way of obtaining outcomes in which more specific obligations
are preferred over less specific ones, is to define specificity in terms of logical
strength, and to define a new attack relation for letting more specific arguments
attack less specific ones. Let the factual support of a deontic argument a be the
set S(a) = {B | B ∈ (C(a) ∩ LP )}.
We write S(a) ⊑ S(b) iff for all A ∈ S(a) there is a B ∈ S(b) such that A ⊢ B
and for all B ∈ S(b) there is an A ∈ S(a) such that A ⊢ B. S(a) ⊏ S(b) (a is
more specific than b) iff S(a) ⊑ S(b) and S(b) 6⊑ S(a).
We replace Definition 6 with Definition 9:
Definition 9 (Conflict attack w/specificity). Let a = 〈O−A : . . .〉 and b =
〈OA : . . .〉.
(i) If S(a) ⊏ S(b), then a attacks b and all of b’s super-arguments,
(ii) b attacks a and all of a’s super-arguments, unless a attacks b in view of
clause (i).
Let DAFs (with subscript ‘s’ for specificity) be the logic resulting from
constructing the attack relation Att on the basis of Definitions 5 and 9.
In Example 5, we construct the following arguments from Γ5:
9Understood in this way, specificity cases have been studied extensively in the fields of
non-monotonic logic (see e.g. [7, 5]) and deontic logic (see e.g. [4, 27, 30, 31]).
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a1: 〈Op : q, q ⇒ p〉
a2: 〈O¬p : q ∧ r, (q ∧ r)⇒ ¬p〉
Since S(a2) ⊏ S(a1), a2 attacks a1 by Definition 9, but not vice versa. As
a result, only a2 is in Γ5’s grounded extension, and Γ5 ⊢DAFs O¬p, while
Γ5 6⊢DAFs Op.
In Example 3, the factual support of the arguments constructed from Γ3
is such that S(a2) = S(a5) ⊏ S(a1) = S(a6). By Definition 9, a5 attacks a1
and a2 attacks a6. As a result, the more specific arguments a2 and a5 defeat
the less specific a1 and a6, so that Γ3 ⊢DAFs Os and Γ3 ⊢DAFs O¬r, while
Γ3 6⊢DAFs Or and Γ3 6⊢DAFs O¬s. As before, Γ3 6⊢DAFs O(r ∧ s).
In dealing with conflict-resolution via logical analysis, we have chosen for a
cautious notion of specificity. For instance, {p} 6⊏ {p, q} and {p} 6⊏ {p∧q, r}. In
certain contexts it may be sensible to opt for a stronger characterization of ‘⊏’.
A detailed discussion of such issues would lead us too far astray given our present
purposes. Instead, we point out that our framework readily accommodates
alternative characterizations of ‘⊏’ to be used in Definition 9.
3.1.2 Resolving conflicts via priorities
Instead of (or in combination with) conflict-resolution via logical analysis, a
priority ordering ≤ can be introduced over conditional norms, and our formal
language can be adjusted accordingly. Conditional norms then come with an
associated degree of priority α ∈ Z+, written A⇒α B (higher numbers denote
higher priorities).
We lift ≤ to a priority ordering  over arguments via the weakest link prin-
ciple: an argument is only as strong as the weakest priority conditional used in
its construction [25]. Let Pr(∆) = {α | A ⇒α B ∈ ∆} and let min(Pr(∆)) be
the lowest α ∈ Pr(∆). Then ∆  ∆′ iff min(Pr(∆)) ≤ min(Pr(∆′)). Relative
to a premise set Γ, we write a  b iff C(a) ∩ Γ⇒  C(b) ∩ Γ⇒. a ≺ b iff a  b
and b 6 a.
We replace Definition 6 with the following definition:
Definition 10 (Prioritized conflict attack). If a 6≺ b, then a = 〈O−A : . . .〉
attacks b = 〈OA : . . .〉 and all of b’s super-arguments.
Let DAF≤ be the logic resulting from constructing the attack relation Att
on the basis of Definitions 5 and 10.
Example 6 (Prioritized conflict attack). Let Γ6 = {p, q, r,¬(s ∧ t ∧ u), p⇒1
s, q ⇒2 t, r ⇒3 u}. We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ6:
a1: 〈¬(s ∧ t ∧ u) : −−〉 a8: 〈O(s ∧ t ∧ u) : a4, a5〉
a2: 〈Os : p, p⇒1 s〉 a9: 〈O¬(t ∧ u) : a2,(s ⊃ ¬(t ∧ u))〉
a3: 〈Ot : q, q ⇒2 t〉 a10: 〈O¬(s ∧ u) : a3,(t ⊃ ¬(s ∧ u))〉
a4: 〈Ou : r, r ⇒3 u〉 a11: 〈O¬(s ∧ t) : a4,(u ⊃ ¬(s ∧ t))〉
a5: 〈O(s ∧ t) : a2, a3〉 a12: 〈O¬u : a5,((s ∧ t) ⊃ ¬u)〉
a6: 〈O(s ∧ u) : a2, a4〉 a13: 〈O¬t : a6,((s ∧ u) ⊃ ¬t)〉
a7: 〈O(t ∧ u) : a3, a4〉 a14: 〈O¬s : a7,((t ∧ u) ⊃ ¬s)〉
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The order of arguments is such that a2, a5, a6, a8, a9, a12, a13 ≺ a3, a7, a10, a14 ≺
a4, a11. By Definition 10, a14 attacks a2, a5, a6, a8, a9, a12, and a13; a3 attacks
a13; a4 attacks a12; a11 attacks a5, a8, and a12; a10 attacks a6 and a13; and a7 at-
tacks a9. By Definition 5, a1 attacks a8. As a result, a1, a3, a4, a7, a10, a11, a14 ∈
G(Γ6), while a2, a5, a6, a8, a9, a12, a13 6∈ G(Γ6). The following obligations are
DAF≤-consequences of Γ6 : Ot,Ou,O(t ∧ u),O¬(s ∧ u),O¬(s ∧ t),O¬s. The
following obligations are not DAF≤-derivable from Γ6 : Os,O(s ∧ t),O(s ∧
u),O(s ∧ t ∧ u),O¬(t ∧ u),O¬u,O¬t.
As with ‘⊏’ in Definition 9, there are other ways of characterizing ‘≺’ in
Definition 10. For instance, instead of lifting ≤ via the weakest link principle,
we could lift it via the strongest link principle, according to which an argument
is as strong as the strongest priority conditional used in its construction.10
Depending on the way ≤ is lifted to , different outcomes are possible with
respect to the priority puzzles studied in e.g. [9, 14, 15]. A thorough investigation
of these puzzles within our framework is left for an extended version of this
paper.
3.2 Anticipating violations and conflicts
Obligations which are violated or conflicted should not be detached. But what
about obligations that commit us to violations or conflicts? Consider the fol-
lowing example, adapted from [16, 19].
Example 7. Let Γ7 = {p, p ⇒ q, q ⇒ r, r ⇒ ¬p}. We construct the following
arguments on the basis of Γ7:
a1: 〈p : −−〉 a3: 〈Or : a2, q ⇒ r〉
a2: 〈Oq : p, p⇒ q〉 a4: 〈O¬p : a3, r⇒ ¬p〉
Suppose you are throwing a party. Let p (resp. q, r) abbreviate ‘Peggy (resp.
Quincy, Ruth) is invited to the party’. If Peggy is invited, then Quincy should
be invited as well (perhaps because they are good friends and we know both of
them). Likewise, if Quincy is invited then Ruth should be invited as well. But
if Ruth is invited, then Peggy should not be (perhaps because we know Ruth and
Peggy do not get along well). It is settled that Peggy is invited. You already
sent her the official invitation, and it would be too awkward to tell her she can’t
come. Should Quincy and/or Ruth be invited?
Arguments a1, a2, and a3 are in Γ7’s grounded extension G(Γ7). a4 is not
in G(Γ7) since it is attacked by a1 according to Definition 5; consequently,
Γ7 ⊢DAF Oq and Γ7 ⊢DAF Or, while Γ7 6⊢DAF O¬p.
A more cautious reasoner may argue that Oq and Or should not be detached,
since they lead to a commitment to O¬p: they form part of the detachment chain
10If the strongest link principle is used, Definition 10 should no longer allow for attacks on
super-arguments, since a 6≺ b no longer warrants that a 6≺ c where c is a super-argument of
b. A further alternative is to use the last link principle, according to which an argument gets
the priority of the conditional which occurs last in its proof sequence.
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of a4. This commitment reflects very badly on arguments a2 and a3, since O¬p
is violated.
To model this behavior, we introduce the deontic doubt operator ⊙. We will
use this operator to construct new arguments, called shadow arguments, the
conclusion of which is of the form ⊙A. A shadow argument with conclusion
⊙A casts doubt on – and attacks – arguments with conclusion OA. Shadow
arguments cannot be used to support obligations, but only to attack other
arguments. They can only rule out deontic arguments. They cannot generate
new consequences.11
In the resulting system DAF⊙, our language L is adjusted so as to include
members of P within the scope of the new operator ⊙. Arguments are con-
structed in line with Definition 11:
Definition 11. Given a premise set Γ, we allow rules (i)-(vii) for constructing
arguments, where (i)-(v) are the rules from Definition 4:
(vi) If a = 〈A : −−〉 is an argument, then 〈⊙−A : a〉 is an argument;
(vii) If a = 〈OA : . . .〉 is an argument, then 〈⊙−A : a〉 is an argument.
We say that an argument a has minimal support if there is no argument b
with the same conclusion such that C(b) ⊂ C(a). In DAF⊙ the attack relation
is constructed on the basis of Definition 12:12
Definition 12 (Shadow attack). Where a = 〈OA : . . .〉 has minimal support:
(i) Where b is a deontic sub-argument of a, 〈⊙A : . . .〉 attacks b as well as all
of b’s super-arguments,
(ii) Where b is a deontic sub-argument of a and ∅ 6= Θ ⊆ UO(a), 〈⊙
∧
Θ : . . .〉
attacks b as well as all of b’s super-arguments.
Reconsider Γ7 from Example 7. From a1, we can construct the shadow
argument a5 = 〈⊙¬p : a1〉. By clause (i) of Definition 12, a5 attacks a4, a3,
and a2. As a result, a2 and a3 are no longer in G(Γ7). Γ7 6⊢DAF⊙ Oq and
Γ7 6⊢DAF⊙ Or.
Example 8. Let Γ8 = {s,⊤ ⇒ p,⊤ ⇒ q, (p ∧ q) ⇒ r, r ⇒ ¬s, q ⇒ t}. We
construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ8:
11Shadow arguments are similar in spirit to Caminada’s HY-arguments from [2]. An HY-
argument a is an incoherent argument constructed on the basis of the conclusion of another
argument b. Since a shows that b leads to incoherence, b’s conclusion is attacked by the HY-
argument a. Caminada shows how in the presence of HY-arguments, the property of cautious
monotonicity may be restored for AFs. The same holds true for shadow arguments in our
setting (cfr. infra). As Caminada’s construction is defined within a framework consisting only
of literals and (defeasible) rules relating (conjunctions of) literals, we cannot employ it in our
setting.
12By the construction of Definition 12, Definitions 5 and 6 become redundant in DAF⊙.
All cases covered by these definitions are covered already by Definition 12.
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a1: 〈s : −−〉 a5: 〈Or : a4, (p ∧ q)⇒ r〉
a2: 〈Op : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ p〉 a6: 〈O¬s : a5, r ⇒ ¬s〉
a3: 〈Oq : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ q〉 a7: 〈Ot : a3, q ⇒ t〉
a4: 〈O(p ∧ q) : a2, a3〉 a8: 〈⊙¬s : a1〉
By Definition 12 the shadow argument a8 attacks a6 as well as its sub-
arguments a2−a5. Moreover, it attacks a7, which is a super-argument of a3. As
a result, none of the conclusions of arguments a2-a7 are DAF⊙-consequences
of Γ8.
Example 4 no longer serves as a counter-example to properties 4 and 5
provided in Section 2.5. We can construct the shadow argument a12 : 〈⊙s : a5〉.
By clause (i) of Definition 12, this argument attacks a4 as well as its sub-
arguments a1-a3. As a result of this attack, Γ4 6⊢DAF⊙ Oq and Γ4 6⊢DAF⊙ Or.
More generally, we can show that the cautious monotonicity property (Property
4 in Section 2.5) holds for DAF⊙. A proof is provided in Theorem 4 of the
Appendix.
Instead of – and equivalently to – working with the ⊙-operator and Defini-
tions 11 and 12, we could have generalized Definitions 5 and 6 so as to include
attacks on sub-arguments. Definitions 5 and 6 currently entail that if a attacks
b, then a attacks all super-arguments of b. In the generalized form, these defi-
nitions would entail that if a attacks b, then a attacks all superarguments of all
sub-arguments of b.
There are two additional reasons for working with the doubt operator ⊙,
however. First, this operator has a clear and intuitive meaning, and adds ex-
pressivity to our argumentation frameworks. Second, by characterizing shadow
arguments via a separate operator we can think more transparently about (a)
the implementation of additional logical properties of this operator, and (b) al-
ternatives to Definition 12. Regarding (a), think about the strengthening rule
(‘If ⊙A, then ⊙B whenever B ⊢ A’), which carries some intuitive force. Re-
garding (b), reconsider Example 8, and suppose we add the premise ⊤ ⇒ ¬p
to Γ8. A not-so-skeptical reasoner may argue that in this case we should not
be able to cast doubt on the arguments a3 and a7, since the doubt casted on
argument a4 arguably arises in view of the conflicted conditional obligation to
see to it that p.13
4 Related work
Due to space limitations, we restrict our discussion of related formalisms to those
of input/output logic (Section 4.1) and those based on formal argumentation
frameworks (Section 4.2). A comparison with other related deontic systems,
such as Nute’s defeasible deontic logic [22, 21] and Horty’s default-based deontic
logic [13, 10, 11, 15] is left for an extended version of this article.
13Caminada’s HY-arguments from [2] are similar in spirit to this less skeptical proposal.
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4.1 Input/output logic
Like the constrained input/output (I/O) logics from [19], the DAFs defined
here are tools for detaching conditional obligations relative to a set of inputs and
constraints. Unlike most I/O logics, none of these DAFs validates strengthening
of the antecedent (SA) for conditional obligations – from A ⇒ C to infer (A ∧
B)⇒ C. Unrestricted (SA) is counter-intuitive if we allow for conflict-resolution
via logical analysis as defined Section 3.1.1, since it allows the unrestricted
derivation of more specific from less specific conditional obligations.14
Example 9 (DAF and I/O logic). Let Γ9 = {p, p ⇒ q, p ⇒ ¬r, q ⇒ r}. We
construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ9:
a1: 〈Oq : p, p⇒ q〉 a3: 〈Or : a1, q ⇒ r〉
a2 〈O¬r : p, p⇒ ¬r〉
Since a2 and a3 attack each other in view of Definition 6, a2, a3 6∈ G(Γ9),
while a1 ∈ G(Γ9). Consequently, Γ9 6⊢DAF Or and Γ9 6⊢DAF O¬r while
Γ9 ⊢DAF Oq.
In constrained I/O logic, triggered conditional obligations in the input are
divided into maximally consistent subsets (MCSs). Γ⇒9 has three MCSs: {p⇒
q, q ⇒ ¬r}, {p ⇒ q, p ⇒ r}, and {q ⇒ ¬r, p ⇒ r}. In [19] two ways are
presented for dealing with conflicts and constraints: via a full meet operation
on the generated MCSs, or via a full join operation on the generated MCSs.
The first approach gives us none of q, r, and ¬r for Γ9. The second gives us all
three.
Some of the I/O logics defined in e.g. [18, 19, 24] validate intuitively appeal-
ing rules which are not generally valid in our DAFs, such as the rule (OR) – from
A⇒ C and B ⇒ C to infer (A ∨B) ⇒ C. A detailed study of the appeal and
implementation of (OR) and similar rules in the present argumentative setting
is left for future investigation.
4.2 Formal argumentation
Several ways of modeling normative reasoning on the basis of formal argumen-
tation have been proposed in the literature. For instance, the approach in [8]
is based on bipolar abstract argumentation frameworks. Dung’s abstract argu-
mentation frameworks are enriched with a support relation that is defined over
the set of abstract arguments. This device is used to express deontic condi-
tionals. A similar idea is used in [23] where a relation for evidential support is
introduced. Argumentation schemes of normative reasoning are there expressed
by means of Prolog-like predicates and subsequently translated into an argumen-
tation framework. Here, we follow the tradition of structured or instantiated
argumentation in which no support relation between arguments is needed. In
our approach conditional obligations are modeled by a dyadic operator ⇒ that
14In [29] an I/O system is presented which invalidates (SA) in the context of exempted
permissions which are subject to conflict-resolution via logical analysis (specificity).
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is part of the object language. Arguments consist of sequences of applications
of factual and deontic detachment. As a consequence, for instance, evidential
or factual support is an intrinsic feature of our arguments and is modeled via
the factual detachment rule.
The general setting of our DAFs is close to ASPIC+. For instance, in the
dynamic legal argumentation systems (in short, DLAS) from [26], deontic condi-
tionals are also modeled via a defeasible conditional  in the object language.
There are several differences to our approach. For instance, our conditionals
are not restricted to conjunctions of literals as antecedents. As a consequence
we needed to define a strong fact attack rule (Def. 5) that, in order to avoid
contamination problems (see Ex. 2), warrants that arguments with inconsis-
tent supports are defeated.15 Our fact attack and our shadow attack rules do
not conform to the standard attack types defined in ASPIC+ (rebutting, un-
dercutting, and undermining). Our conflict attacks can be seen as forms of
ASPIC+-type rebuttals where the contrary of OA is defined by O¬A.
Unlike DLAS or Horty’s deontic default logics, we follow the tradition in
deontic logic to have a dedicated operator O for unconditional obligations which,
for instance, allows to formally distinguish between cases of deontic and cases
of factual detachment.
Recently, van der Torre & Villata extended the DLAS approach with deon-
tic modalities [32], adopting the input/output methodology from Section 4.1.
The resulting systems, like DAF, allow for versions of the factual and deontic
detachment rules. Moreover, they allow for the representation of permissive
norms. Unlike DAF, and unlike the I/O logics from Section 4.1, these systems
do not have inheritance (weakening) or aggregation rules.
Another approach in which formal argumentation is used for the analysis of
traditional problems of deontic logic, such as contrary-to-duty and specificity
cases is [31]. There, arguments are Gentzen-type sequents in the language of
standard deontic logic and conditionals are expressed using material implication.
One drawback which is avoided in our setting is that there conditionals are
contrapositable and subject to strengthening of the antecedent.
5 Outlook
We presented a basic logic, DAF, for detaching conditional obligations based
on Dung’s grounded semantics for formal argumentation. We extended DAF
with mechanisms for conflict-resolution and for the anticipation of conflicts and
violations. For now, these mechanisms mainly serve to illustrate the modularity
of our framework. A detailed study of e.g. different approaches to prioritized
reasoning, or different conceptions of specificity-based conflict-resolution, is left
for an extended companion paper.
We conclude by mentioning three challenges for future research. The first is
to include permission statements. The second is to increase the ‘logicality’ of
15Other solutions to this problem have been proposed, e.g., in [33].
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our framework by allowing for the nesting and for the truth-functional combi-
nation of formulas of the form OA,A ⇒ B, or A. The third is to extend our
focus beyond grounded extensions, and to study how our framework behaves
when subjected to different types of acceptability semantics for formal argu-
mentation. Working with Dung’s preferred semantics [6], for instance, allows
for the derivation of so-called floating conclusions [12, 17].
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Suppose we have a DAF 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉 and G is the grounded extension of
〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉. In the following we write ∆ ≡ ∆′ if ∆ and ∆′ are equivalent in
CL, i.e., CnCL(∆) = CnCL(∆
′).
Lemma 1. If a ∈ G and b attacks a then there is a c that fact attacks b.
Proof. Suppose a ∈ G. Hence, there is a minimal i such that a ∈ Gi. Suppose
b attacks a. Hence, there is a ai−1 ∈ Gi−1 that attacks b in some subargument
bi−1. If the attack is a conflict attack, bi−1 attacks ai−1. Since ai−1 ∈ Gi−1,
there is a ai−2 ∈ Gi−2 that attacks bi−1 in some subargument bi−2. If the attack
is a conflict attack we can find another ai−3 ∈ Gi−3 that attacks bi−2 in some
subargument bi−3, etc. At some point we reach i − k = 0. Note that ai−k fact
attacks bi−k since otherwise bi−k attacks ai−k which contradicts ai−k ∈ G0.
Lemma 2. If a ∈ G then a ∈ G1.
Proof. Follows immediately with Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. If a ∈ Gi and b is obtained from a by weakening then also b ∈ Gi.
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Proof. Suppose b = 〈OA′ : a〉 is obtained from a = 〈OA : . . .〉 by weakening via
(A ⊃ A′) and suppose c attacks b. If c fact attacks b then it also fact attacks
a since 〈UO(a) ≡ UO(b)〉. If c = 〈O−A′ : . . .〉 conflict attacks b then we can
obtain c′ = 〈O−A : c〉 be weakening of c. Since c′ conflict attacks a, a ∈ G by
Lemma 1 c′ is fact attacked by some d. Since UO(c) ≡ UO(c′) also c is fact
attacked by d.
Lemma 4. Where a ∈ G and b is a subargument of a, also b ∈ G.
Proof. Suppose c attacks b. Since a is a superargument of b, c also attacks a
and thus c is fact attacked by Lemma 1.
Definition 13. Let a = 〈OA1 : . . .〉 be an argument with UO(a) = {A1, . . . , An}
and let pi be a permutation of {2, . . . , n}. We know that for each Ai ∈ UO(a)
there is a subargument bi = 〈OAi : . . .〉 of a. We construct the argument
api = 〈O
∧
UO(a) : . . .〉 as follows.
• api1 = 〈OA1 : . . .〉 = a = b1
• api2 = 〈O(A1 ∧Api(2)) : a
pi
1 , bpi(2)〉
• apii = 〈O((A1 ∧ . . . ∧ Api(i−1)) ∧ Api(i)) : a
pi
i−1, bpi(i)〉
When we write a we refer to apin for pi = id (i.e., pi(i) = i).
The following fact follows in view of Definition 13 and the definition of UO:
Fact 1. UO(a) ≡ UO(a)
Lemma 5. Where a = 〈OA1 : . . .〉 and UO(a) = {A1, . . . , An}: If a ∈ G then
also api ∈ G where pi is an arbitrary permutation over {2, . . . , n}.
Proof. We show the claim by a parallel induction for all apii where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Base case: api1 = a and thus the claim holds by the supposition.
Induction step: We show the claim holds for apii+1. Suppose c attacks a
pi
i+1.
Case 1 : c fact attacks apii+1. Then ¬
∧
(UO(apii )∪UO(bpi(i+1))) ∈ CnL(Γ).
By the induction hypothesis, both apii and bpi(i+1) are in G. By weakening there is
an argument (O¬
∧
UO(bpi(i+1)) : a
pi
i ) which attacks bpi(i+1). By Lemma 3, this
argument is also in G. This is a contradiction since then G is not conflict-free.
Case 2 : c conflict attacks apii+1. Thus, c is of the form 〈O¬(A1 ∧Api(2)∧ . . .∧
Api(i+1)) : . . .〉. By aggregation and weakening c
′ = 〈O¬Api(i+1) : a
pi
i , c〉 ∈ A(Γ).
This argument attacks bpi(i+1). Since, by Lemma 4, bpi(i+1) ∈ G, c
′ is fact
attacked in view of Lemma 1. Hence ¬
∧
(UO(apii ) ∪ UO(c)) ∈ CnL(Γ). By
weakening, c′′ = 〈O¬(A1∧Api(2)∧ . . .∧Api(i)), c〉 ∈ A(Γ). This argument attacks
apii and since by the induction hypothesis, a
pi
i ∈ G, and by Lemma 1, c
′′ is fact
attacked. Since in view of Fact 1 UO(c) ≡ UO(c′′), also c is fact attacked.
Lemma 6. Where a = 〈OA : . . .〉 ∈ G and b = 〈OB : . . .〉 ∈ G, also the
argument c = 〈O(A ∧B) : a, b〉 obtained from a and b by aggregation is in G.
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Proof. Suppose some d attacks c.
Case 1 : d fact attacks c. Hence, ¬
∧
(UO(a)∪UO(b)) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ). Since by
Lemma 5 a = 〈O
∧
UO(a) : . . .〉 ∈ G(Γ), we also get by weakening and Lemma
3 that 〈O¬
∧
UO(b) : a〉 ∈ G(Γ). However, b ∈ G(Γ) by Lemma 5. This is a
contradiction since a attacks b.
Case 2 : d = 〈O−D : . . .〉 conflict attacks c. If D ∈ UO(a) or D ∈ UO(b),
then d also conflict attacks a or b. Thus, by Lemma 1, d is fact attacked. If
d = 〈O−(A ∧B) : . . .〉 we construct the argument f = 〈O(A ∧−(A ∧B)) : d, a〉
and by weakening f ′ = 〈O¬B : f〉. Since f ′ attacks b and by Lemma 1, f ′ is fact
attacked. Hence, ¬
∧
UO(f ′) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ). Since UO(f ′) = UO(d) ∪ UO(a),
also ¬
∧
(UO(d) ∪ UO(a)) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ). Hence, by weakening d we get d′ =
〈O¬
∧
UO(a) : d〉. Since a ∈ G(Γ), d′ attacks a and by Lemma 1, d′ is fact
attacked. Since UO(d′) ≡ UO(d) in view of Fact 1, also d is fact attacked.
Altogether, any attacker of c is fact attacked and hence c ∈ G(Γ).
The following lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 7. If Γ ⊢DAF OA and Γ ⊢DAF OB then also Γ ⊢DAF O(A ∧B).
Theorem 1. If Γ ⊢DAF OA for each A ∈ ∆ and B ∈ CnCL(∆), then Γ ⊢DAF
OB.
Proof. By compactness there is a finite {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ ∆ such that B ∈
CnCL({A1, . . . , An}). By multiple applications of Lemma 7, Γ ⊢DAF
∧n
i=1 Ai.
By Lemma 3, Γ ⊢DAF B.
Theorem 2. There is no A for which Γ ⊢DAF OA and Γ ⊢DAF O¬A.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that Γ ⊢DAF OA and Γ ⊢DAF O¬A. Thus,
there are a = 〈OA : . . .〉 ∈ G(Γ) and b = 〈O¬A : . . .〉 ∈ G(Γ). However, since b
conflict attacks a, this is not possible since G(Γ) is conflict-free.
Theorem 3. Let ∆⇒ = {⊤ ⇒ A | A ∈ ∆}. If Γ ⊢DAF OA for all A ∈ ∆ and
Γ ∪∆⇒ ⊢DAF OB, then Γ ⊢DAF OB.
Proof. Let ∆ = {A1, . . . , An} and Γ′ = Γ ∪∆⇒. By the supposition we know
that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a ai = 〈OAi : . . .〉 ∈ G(Γ). Let a0i = 〈OAi :
⊤,⊤ ⇒ Ai〉 ∈ A(Γ′). By the supposition, there is a b = 〈OB : . . .〉 ∈ G(Γ′).
Let b[a0
1
/a1,...,a0n/an]
be the result of replacing each subargument a0i by ai in b.
Suppose now that some c attacks b[a0
1
/a1,...,a0n/an]
in 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉.
Case 1 : c also attacks b in 〈A(Γ′),Att(Γ′)〉. Hence, by Lemma 1, there is a e
that fact attacks c and thus¬
∧
UO(c) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ′). Hence, also¬
∧
UO(c) ∈
Cn
L
(Γ) and thus c is also fact attacked in 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉.
Case 2 : c does not attack b in 〈A(Γ′),Att(Γ′)〉. We have two cases: (a)
c = 〈O−C : . . .〉 for some C ∈
⋃n
i=1 UO(ai) \ UO(b), or (b) c fact attacks
b[a0
1
/a1,...,a0n/an]
.
We first show that case (b) is not possible. In this case ¬
∧
(UO(a1) ∪
. . . ∪ UO(an) ∪ UO(b)) ∈ CnL(Γ). Hence, (
∧
(
⋃n
i=1 UO(ai)) ⊃ ¬
∧
UO(b)) ∈
Cn
L
(Γ). Note that since ai ∈ G(Γ) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by Lemma 5,
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also ai ∈ G(Γ). Moreover, we know by multiple applications of Lemma 7,
that also aˆ = aˆn ∈ G(Γ) where aˆ2 = 〈O
∧
(UO(a1) ∪ UO(a2)) : a1, a2〉, . . . ,
aˆn = 〈O
∧n
i=1
∧
UO(ai) : ˆan−1, an〉. By weakening and Lemma 3, also aˆ′ =
〈O¬
∧
UO(b) : aˆ〉 ∈ G(Γ). Note that aˆ′ attacks b in 〈A(Γ′),Att(Γ′)〉. Thus,
by Lemma 1, aˆ′ is fact attacked and ¬
∧
UO(aˆ′) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ′). Thus, also
¬
∧
UO(aˆ′) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ). Hence, aˆ′ is also fact attacked in 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉.
This contradicts aˆ′ ∈ G(Γ).
In case (a), c attacks some ai. Since ai ∈ G(Γ) and by Lemma 1, c is fact
attacked in 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉.
We have shown that every attacker of b[a0
1
/a1,...,a0n/an]
is fact attacked in
〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉 and thus b[a0
1
/a1,...,a0n/an]
∈ G(Γ).
We now move to DAFs with shadow attacks. In the following we will silently
assume that Lemma 1 also applies to argumentation frameworks with shadow
attacks, but leave the simple proof to the reader.
Theorem 4. Suppose Γ ⊢DAF⊙ OA and Γ ⊢DAF⊙ OB then Γ∪{⊤ ⇒ A} ⊢DAF⊙
OB.
Proof. Let Γ′ = Γ ∪ {⊤ ⇒ A}. Since Γ ⊢DAF⊙ OA and Γ ⊢DAF⊙ OB, there
are a = 〈OA : . . .〉 ∈ G(Γ) and b = 〈OB : . . .〉 ∈ G(Γ). Suppose c attacks b
in 〈A(Γ′),Att(Γ′)〉. If c ∈ A(Γ), it is fact attacked in 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉 and thus
also in 〈A(Γ′),Att(Γ′)〉. Suppose now that c ∈ A(Γ′) \ A(Γ). Thus, there is a
subargument 〈OA : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ A〉 of c.
Case 1: c fact attacks b. Then ¬
∧
UO(b) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ′) and hence also
¬
∧
UO(b) ∈ Cn
L
(Γ). Thus, b is also fact attacked in 〈A(Γ),Att(Γ)〉 which
contradicts b ∈ G(Γ).
Case 2: c = (OC : . . .) conflict attacks b. Let ca ∈ A(Γ) be the argument
obtained by replacing the subargument 〈OA : ⊤,⊤ ⇒ A〉 in c by a. Let c′a ∈
A(Γ) be a minimal subargument of ca with conclusion OC. Since c
′
a attacks b,
b ∈ G(Γ), and by Lemma 1, c′a is fact attacked by some d = 〈¬
∧
Θ : −−〉
where Θ ⊆ UO(c′a). Thus, there is also a d⊙ = 〈⊙
∧
Θ : d〉 that shadow attacks
c′a. Define for any argument g, base(g) as the set of all subarguments based on
factual detachment 〈OG : K,K ⇒ G〉 of g. Note that base(c′a) ⊆ base(ca) ⊆
base(a) ∪ base(c). We distinguish two cases: (a) base(c′a) ∩ base(a) = ∅ and
(b) base(c′a) ∩ base(a) 6= ∅. In case (a), base(c
′
a) ⊆ base(c). Since c
′
a is fact
attacked, also c is fact attacked. In case (b), since c′a is shadow attacked by
d⊙ and minimal, also each subargument of c
′
a is shadow attacked by d⊙. Since
base(c′a) ∩ base(a) 6= ∅, there is also a subargument a
′ of a that is shadow
attacked by d⊙. Since a
′ cannot be defended from this attack and a ∈ G(Γ) this
is a contradiction.
We have thus shown that c is fact attacked. Since c was arbitrary this is
sufficient to show that b ∈ G(Γ′).
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